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THE MOTOR CAR AND THE LAW
THE HONOURABLE J. C. MCRUER, Q.C., LL.D.--
I
Throughout known legal history there has been an evolving
concept of justice, largely moulded by a combination of moral theory
and felt necessity. This has been particularly true of the development
of the common law. Lord Macmillan once said,
... the common law is a practical code adapted to deal with the manifold
diversities of human life...1
The rapid advance of science during the past century and par-
ticularly during the last half of that century has created new social
conditions demanding new processes of government to meet those
social conditions which have created grave problems not only in
the administration of justice but in the development of just laws.
In many areas the conventional judicial process has proved to be quite
inadequate to provide rules by which men should be governed and it
has fallen to the Legislature and to the Executive not only to deter-
mine the rules but the processes by which they are to be applied.
In large measure the right to compensation implies a wrong-doer
and liability implies a failure in a duty owed, but this is not always
true.
Earliest legal history shows a development of a concept of
liability even where the concept of wrong or a wrong-doer was
obscure or entirely absent. In primitive times the event determined
the liability simply because a process or means of determining or
measuring the wrongfulness of the act did not exist. It took at least
1,000 years to develop a doctrine of fault and it was not until the
19th century that any clear doctrine evolved.
The Sumerian, Hammurabian and Mosaic laws all provided for
compensation but it was in the nature of a penalty on the happening
of the event.
* The Honourable J. C. McRuer, Q.C., LL.D., sometime Justice of Appeal
in the Supreme Court of Ontario and Chief Justice of the High Court of
Justice for Ontario, is presently Chairman of the Ontario Law Reform Com-
mission and is conducting the Ontario Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil
Rights. This article is the text of a paper delivered at the Third Common.
wealth and Empire Law Conference held in Sydney, Australia, August 25.
September 1, 1965.
1 Read v. J. Lyons & Company, Limited, [1947] A.C. 156, at p. 175.
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If a man cut off the foot of another with an . .. instrument "10 silver
shekels he shall pay"2-liability but not compensation.
"If a physician operate on a slave of a freeman for a severe wound with
a bronze lancet and cause his death, he shall restore a slave of equal
value" 3-a concept of compensation only.
"When men strive together, and 'hurt a woman with child, so that there
is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt her shall
be fined, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and
he shall pay as the judges determine,"4-compensation by judicial assess-
ment.
In none of these cases is there any concept of fault. In the Mosaic
law there was a curious mixture of vengeance, punishment and some
idea of compensation. If in the illustration I have just given harm
should come to the unfortunate woman "then you shall give life
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,
burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe",5-punishment
but no compensation, and "When an ox gores a man or a woman
to death, the ox shall be stoned . . . but the owner of the ox shall
be clear" 6 -the punishment fell on the ox only-"But if the ox
has been accustomed to gore in the past, . . . the ox shall be stoned,
and its owner also shall be put to death"7 - the punishment fell on
the ox and the owner. However, the unfortunate owner was given a
right to ransom his life: "If ransom is laid on him, then he shall
give for the redemption of his life whatever is laid upon him."8
"When one man's ox hurts another's, so that it dies, then they shall
sell the live ox and divide the price of it; and the dead beast also
they shall divide. Or if it is known that the ox has been accustomed
to gore in the past, and its owner has not kept it in, he shall pay
ox for ox, and the dead beast shall be his,"9-absolute liability in
certain cases with one scale of compensation and in others liability
with a principle of scienter and with another scale of compensation.
These and many other principles of the Mosaic law have been re-
flected in the Roman law, the Teutonic law and in the English law.10
In the early English law, as in the early laws of the Middle East,
the concepts of punishment and compensation were ill defined.
Criminal law and what was to become tort law were for centuries
scarcely distinguishable. In the laws of Aethelbirht promulgated in the
6th century, a specific code of payments for named injuries was
set out, e.g.:
38. If a shoulder be lamed, let 'bot' be made with 30 shillings.1'
35. If there be an injury of the bone, let 'bot' be made with 4 shillings.12
43. If an eye be (struck) out, let 'bot' be made with 100 shillings. 13
2 Samuel Noah Kramer, History Begins at Sumer, p. 53. See also Wig-
more, Panorama of the WorZd LegaZ Systems, Vol. 1, p. 84.
3 The Code of Hammurabi, edited by Robert Francis Harper, p. 77 et seq.
4 Exodus, 21: 22.
5 Ibid., 21: 23-25.
6 Ibid., 21: 28
7 /bid., 21: 29.
8 Ibid., 21: 30.
9 Ibid., 21: 35.
10 Holmes, The Common Law, p. 15 et seq.
11 Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, 1840, Vol. 1, p. 15.
12 Ibid., p. 13.
13 Ibid., p. 15.
1966]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
But laws were one thing, administration was another. Before
organized political order took form, redress for injury was in the
hands of the injured man and his relatives. The blood feud was the
administrative process. At first, voluntary compensation might be
accepted, as in the Hebrew law and the Roman law.14 If the com-
pensation offered was not accepted the blood feud followed. Later,
social pressure demanded "that an act causing physical damage must,
in the interests of peace, be paid for" in all but a few exceptional
cases. Even where the act was accidental or in self-defence compensa-
tion must be paid.15
Until comparatively recent years law was concerned only with
the act not with the state of mind of one who had injured another.
Up to 1828 even the man who committed homicide by misadventure
or in self-defence did not in theory escape punishment.16
The form of the early oath that the defendant was required to
take to escape liability delineated the law. He was required to swear
that he had done nothing whereby the person slain was "nearer to
death or further from life".' 7 The defendant was liable, upon it being
shown that he voluntarily did the act from which the damage flowed
as an immediate consequence. Proof of trespass vi et armis was what
was required. Proof of fault was immaterial.1 8 This doctrine of
absolute liability for all one's voluntary acts was somewhat modified
in 1616 by the decision in Weaver v. Ward,19 which is one of the
milestones marking progress in English law. In a case of persona]
trespass the court held that the defendant could escape liability if he
showed that he was utterly without fault.
It may be that, as Wigmore says, there were vague ideas in the
early English law of "inevitable necessity", "unavoidable accident",
"could not do otherwise"20 which, as the seeds of the doctrine of
negligence, were planted in the judicial mind even a century before
Weaver v. "Ward, nevertheless this case at any rate shows when they
really began to germinate. The growth of the concept of liability due
to fault was slow and even yet it cannot be said that there is any
exhaustive or comprehensive definition of actionable negligence.
Fleming says that it is misleading even today to speak of a tort of
negligence.21 Until the 19th century "the history of negligence is a
skein of threads, most of which are fairly distinct, and no matter
where we cut the skein we shall get little more than a bundle of
frayed ends." 22
14 Gaius Inst., iii, 189; Just. Instit. iv, 4, 7; Girard, Droit Romain, p. 396.
15 Holdsworth, A History of Englisk Law, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 44, 51.
16 Ibid., p. 52; see 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 10.
17 Ibid.
18 Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems, p. 29
19 (1616) Hobart 134; 80 E.R. 284.
20 J. H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts (1894), 7 Harv. L. Rev.
443.
21 See Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 3 Bing. N.C. 467, 132 E.R. 490, for de-
velopment of the standard of "the care which a prudent man would take ..
22 P. H. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts (1926),
42 L.Q.R. 184, at p. 185.
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The idea of negligence mainly developed out of a duty based on
some sort of contractual relationship: ". . . the duty of every artificer
to exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought."23 The liability of
the innkeeper and the common carrier was expanded to include the
apothecary, and the surgeon, but in all these cases there was some
contractual relationship. Negligence was not regarded as an indepen-
dent tort. It was well into the 19th century before there was any
great development in the growth of the idea of negligence as a right
of action not based on some particular relationship. Winfield attrib-
utes the rapid growth of the idea after about 1825 chiefly to the use
of industrial machinery and railway trains.
24
Any attempt to classify remedial actions now coming under the
titular heading of torts is in fact very modem. The first book on the
subject was produced by Addison in 1860. Mr. Justice Holmes said
of it:
We are inclined to think that torts is not a proper subject for a law
book.25
When Addison wrote his book he was dealing with a subject
which had very recently experienced a substantial metamorphosis.
The primitive law which stressed security with fault as of no conse-
quence was challenged by the philosophical emphasis on freedom of
action and an ecclesiastical influence which pressed for the recogni-
tion of culpability as a basis for tort liability. Actually a dual basis
of liability eventually evolved which recognized the need for security
in certain cases and demanded proof of culpability in others. An
answer to the demand for proof of culpability was made possible by
the development of a more efficient judicial procedure and better
means of proof but the demands for security continued to have a
part in moulding the law. There still remained those cases where
proof of fault according to recognized legal standards might either
be impossible or so difficult as to destroy any right to relief. It is in
these cases that the common law still acknowledges the principle of
strict liability. The classes of the "strict liability" cases and "fault"
cases have never remained constant. The courts and the legislatures
have joined together to expand and contract these classes by requir-
ing proof of culpability where liability was formerly strict or by
imposing strict liability where proof of fault was formerly required.
Besides the expansion and contraction of these classes, the Legisla-
ture has declared that in certain circumstances there is to be no
liability no matter what the culpability may be. In addition, through
the subtle doctrine of onus of proof developed either by judicial deci-
sion or legislative action, liability which in theory is founded on fault
has in practice become strict liability.
It has not been legal scholarship nor legal philosophy that has
dictated the swings of the pendulum toward and away from strict tort
23 F.N.B. 94, D; Winfield, supra, footnote 22, at p. 185.
24 Supra, footnote 22, at p. 195.
25 W. A. Seavey, Principles of Torts (1942), 56 Harv. L. Rev. 72.
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liability but rather "the felt necessities of the time" 26 brought about
by changes in the social and industrial manner of living. The "code"
has been "adapted to deal with the manifold diversities of human
life..."
May I give a few illustrations:
Down to the end of the 17th century (1698) it was the law of
England that the defendant was liable for damage caused by fire for
which he was responsible whether the damage was caused by negli-
gence or misfortune.27
Parliament abolished the responsibility for accidental fires in
houses in 1711.28
The common law of England always had held and still holds the
owner of animals that trespass on the property of others liable for
property damage caused by them on the ground that "a man should
so occupy his common that he does no wrong to another man." The
defendant cannot escape liability by showing that he exercised all
reasonable care to keep his livestock confined.29 This doctrine of the
common law, so obviously unsuited for vast grazing areas of Canada
and the United States of America, either has not been followed by
the courts or it has been changed by legislation. In Nebraska, where
grazing is a dominant factor in the economy of the State, the courts
refused to apply it.30 In Pennsylvania, with changing conditions, the
pendulum swung more than its full course. By an Act of the Com-
monwealth in 1700, the common law was reversed by putting the
owner of land under obligation to fence his land to keep cattle out.
In 1889 the Act of 1700 was repealed and the common law restored.31
The early law held the owner strictly liable for personal injuries
caused by animals on proof of knowledge of the vice of the animal.
The Hebraic law of the "ox accustomed to gore" was the one that
applied, except in those cases where the vice could not be shown, but
it could be shown that the owner incited the animal to trespass.32
There is, however, a class of animals that are "naturally mischievous
in their kind" and for such their owners were strictly liable for
injury done by them.33 Whether animals fall into the class requiring
proof of scienter or into the class that are naturally mischievous in
their kind is by a strange turn of the common law a question of law
and not a question of fact.
34
26 Holmes, opus cit., p. 1.
27 Tubervil v. Stamp, 1 Salk 13.
28 10 Anne, c. 14, para. 1.
29 Wigmore, supra, footnote 20, at p. 451.
30 Delaney v. Erickson (1880), 10 Neb. 492, 10 N.W. 600.
31 Eldredge, op. cit. p. 41. See also Erdman v. Gottshall (1899), 9 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 295; Barber v. Mensch, 157 Pa. 390, 27 A. 708.
32 Wigmore, supra, footnote 20, at p. 450. See also Cox v. Burbicdge
(1863), 13 C.B.N.S. 430 at p. 438.
33 Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. Rep. 332; May v. Burdett, (1846), 9 Q.B. 99.
34 Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 1. See Glanville
Williams, Liability for Animals, (1939), p. 265, for origin of liability for
animals.
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The practical effect of Donoghue v. Stevenson35 and Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mills Limited36 was so to shift the onus of proof
as to make manufacturers virtually insurers that their products will
not do damage to consumers through defect in manufacturing.
Fleming's comment on these cases appears to be warranted:
This accords with the modem policy of providing increased security to
the individual against the ordinary or 'typical' hazards of life, and of
furthering effective loss distribution among those sections of the public
who benefit from the enterprise in question. 37
II
The drift from strict liability to liability dependent only on fault
was accelerated by the abolition of forms of actions in 1852. To
regulate this drift the court made exceptions by developing new rules
and applying old principles. In 1866 such an exception was made in
Rylands v. Fletcher.38 The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher was in its
time considered revolutionary and it is not yet recognized in all
common law countries. Whether it is followed or not, Mr. Justice
Field was not warranted in the statement he made in The Nitro-
glycerine Case,39 four years after the decision in the House of Lords.
In quoting from Harvey v. DunZap40 he said:
'No case or principle can be found', said Mr. Justice Nelson in denying
a new trial, 'or if found can be maintained subjecting an individual to
liability for an act done without fault on his part,' and in this conclusion
we all agree.
Earl, C. expressed views not dissimilar to Mr. Justice Field in Losee
v. Buchanan4 ' in repudiating the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.
These statements quite overlook the whole catalogue of actions where
an action could be maintained in the past and can yet be maintained
without proof of fault.
To this catalogue may be added nuisance cases, actions based on
trover, innkeepers' cases and the vicarious liability of the master.42
35 [19321 A.C. 562.
36 [19361 A.C. 85.
37 Fleming, Law of Torts, (1st ed.), p. 510.
38 (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
39 (1872) 15 Wall. 524 at p. 537.
40 Lalor's Reports, p. 193.
41 51 N.Y. 476.
42 The principles of 1?ylands v. Fletcher involving liability without fault
have been applied in many different circumstances in the courts of the United
States of America: e.g., the defendant was held liable for damages caused
by debris hurled on the plaintiff's lands without proof of fault or absence of
due care: Muichanock v. The Whitehall Cement Manufacturing Company,
253 Pa. 262. The defendant was held liable without proof of negligence where
an oil well blew out causing damage to the plaintiff's lands: Green v. General
Petroleum Corporation, 205 Calif. 328, 270 P. 952. The doctrine was applied
in an explosion case in Bradford Glycerine Company v. St. Mary's Woollen
Manufacturing Co., 60 Ohio 560. A court consisting of Judge Augustus N.
Hand, Judge Learned Hand and Judge Swan, after elaborately digesting the
American authorities, held that the absence of negligence was immaterial
where a powder magazine exploded and caused damage to real property
and personal injuries: Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Company
(1931), 54 F. 2d 510.
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I do not think it can be said that when the judges promulgated
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher they were making new law. I
think it is more accurate to say they were developing principles of
law to accommodate changing conditions. Blackburn J. in the Ex-
chequer Court seemed to make this quite clear.43
In Read v. J. Lyons and Company, Limited" the House of Lords
refused to apply this line of cases to injuries sustained where there
was no escape of any dangerous thing from the premises on which
the defendant was injured. Lord Macmillan was of the opinion that
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher "is truly a case on the mutual
obligations of the owners or occupiers of neighbouring closes . . .".
He questioned whether the doctrine could be applied where the
damages were for personal injuries as distinguished from property
damage. Lord Porter, after pointing out that it had been held to
apply to personal injury cases in Shiffman v. Order of St. John of
Jerusalem,45 and Wing v. London General Omnibus Co.,46 left this
matter for further examination. Lord Simonds did likewise. Lord
Uthwatt did not discuss the extension of the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher to personal injury cases.
The Ontario courts have extended the application of the doctrine
to personal injury cases, refusing to follow the dictum of Lord
Macmillan in the Read case which would place a higher value on
property than personal security.47
The development of the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher has been
just one of the "necessities of the time". A requirement of proof of
fault would in most cases of this nature deprive injured plaintiffs of
any right to relief. On them would be placed an onus of proof that
rarely could be discharged. Instead of the actor it would be the
injured who would assume the risk. There is, however, a broader
foundation for the doctrine than this. Otherwise an extension of the
principle of res ipsa loquitur would have been sufficient but the courts
have not been content merely to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to these cases.
Since Rylands v. Fletcher it has largely devolved on the legisla-
tures to assume the active role in recognizing the necessity of formu-
lating new tort laws to meet altered conditions of living. The course
followed has been far from consistent but urgent necessities have
been recognized.
In 1880 the British Parliament took the first major step to
reverse the trend of the rules of the common law governing liability
of employers for injuries sustained by their employees in the course
of their employment when the Employers' Liability Act was passed. 4
43 Supra, footnote 38, at p. 279.
[1947] A.C. 156, at p. 158.
45 [1936] 1 All E.R. 557.
46 [1909] 2 K.B. 652, at p. 665.
47 Aldridge v. Van Patter, [1952] O.R. 595.
48 4344 Vict., c. 42.
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A limited class of employees was given a limited right to recover a
limited amount of damages for injuries sustained through the negli-
gence of their fellow servants. Although the Act took away the
defence of common employment in certain cases it left untouched
the defences of contributory negligence and voZenti non fit injuria.
This legislation broke new ground for the growth of the acceptance
of the principle of compensation for workmen without proof of fault
on the part of the employer, a principle which was to be rapidly
developed and expanded throughout the western world, in different
forms of workmen's compensation legislation. The first Workmen's
Compensation Act imposing liability on employers without proof of
fault, for injuries sustained by workmen in the course of their em-
ployment, was passed in Great Britain in 1897. 49 This Act applied
only to certain specified occupations. In 190650 the provisions of the
earlier Act were given general application with few exceptions, and
injuries to health from employment in noxious industries were in-
cluded. It is unnecessary to trace in detail the legislative changes in
Great Britain since 1906. It is sufficient to say that the law has
changed little in principle and that for over half a century British
employers, with few exceptions, have been insurers against accidental
injuries to or death of their workmen. The obligation of compensation
is quite independent of any negligence on the part of the employer
or fellow servants. Liability may be concurrent with liability at
common law or under the Employers' Liability Act (1880) and the
servant may elect between the various remedies open to him.5'
Great Britain was not the first country to legislate in this field.
Finland was the pioneer in 1895; in Germany and Austria provision
was made for contributory employees' compensation funds as early
as 1885 but in no sense could the legislation setting up these funds
be regarded as legislation of the same character as the Finnish or
British legislation. Between 1897 and 1912 the principle of liability
without fault on the part of the employer for employees' injuries
sustained in the course of their employment was adopted in Europe,
South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States
of America.
52
The first Workmen's Compensation Acts brought forth a real
torrent of criticism from legal writers. Such an eminent scholar as
Jeremiah Smith said:
49 Workmen's Compensation Act, 60-61 Vict, c. 37.
50 6 Edw. VI1, c. 58.
51 See 1925 Act, s. 29, 30; Lochgelly Iron & Coal Company Limited v.
M'Mullin, [19341 A.C. 1; Rudd v. Elder Dempster and Company Limited,
[19331 1 K.B. 566.
52 Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Holland, Newfoundland, New
Zealand, Norway, Queensland, Russia, South Australia, Spain, Sweden, Trans-
vaal, Western Australia, the Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Mani-
toba, Nova Scotia and Quebec. The States of California, Illinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Washington and
Wisconsin adopted workmen's compensation laws during the years 1911 and
1912, some of which involved liability without fault on the part of the em-
ployers and others provided for compensation plans. See Workmen's Com-
pensation Report, Ontario, 1913, p. 12 et seq.
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... two stubborn facts remain. First: the statute imposes upon an
employer a duty of compensation, which did not exist under the modern
common law of torts. Second: the theory underlying the statute, its basic
principle, is in direct conflict with the fundamental doctrine of the
modern common law of torts. The statute shows 'a distinct revulsion
from the conception that fault is essential to liability'. It Is 'a distinct
reversion to the earlier conceptions that he who causes harm, however
innocently, is, as its author, bound to make it good.'5
3
In the light of the course of known history it is useful now to quote
the views of other contemporary jurists referred to by Mr. Smith:
54
The time-honoured principles of the law of torts have been cast aside,
a wider rule of responsibility has been framed and no man can now say
what will be the ultimate effects of the new doctrine.
5
The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 was based upon, and Intro.
duced a new and somewhat startling principle.5
6
... the law, lastly, secures for one class of the community an advantage,
as regards insurance against accidents, which other classes can obtain
only at their own expense .... The rights of workmen in regard to com-
pensation for accidents have become a matter not of contract, but of
status.57
... There suddenly arises from all sides an apparently just claim that
a common-law system of rules, which has occupied more than three
hundred years in building up, is ethically bad and economically unsound,
should be thrown into the scrap-heap with other worn-out machinery,
and there should be substituted a new system based on wholly different
principles unknown to the common or any other law until about twenty-
five years ago.
58
It has been said of the Act that it has introduced a novel principle; but
I consider that a misleading euphemism. So far from introducing a
principle it has constituted a most unscientific departure from all the
principles which make up and should make up the law of contract and
tort.5 9
As so often happens with our profession which tends to look upon
change with distaste and often with vigilant repugnance, time has
proved all these forebodings to have been ill founded. The new order
has proved to be better than the old.
TTn
The Province of Ontario claims that it was the first jurisdiction
to develop a really comprehensive Workmen's Compensation scheme
based on liability without fault. The administration is entirely re-
moved from the courts and placed in the hands of an administrative
tribunal. It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the provisions of the
legislation. It is sufficient to say that the first Act passed in 1912
was the result of a Royal Commission presided over by Sir William
Meredith, Chief Justice of Ontario. The Act when it was passed was
endorsed by both employers and employees and continues to be en-
53 Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts (1913-14), 27
Harv. L. Rev. M235, at p. 246.
54 Ibid.
55 P. B. Mignault, 44 Am. Law Rev. 719, at p. 735.
e 56 Ruegg, On Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation, (8th
e d . , . 2 6 3 .Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England, pp. 281-83.
58 Frank Streeter of the New Hampshire Bar, Proceedings of the Maine
State Bar Association, 1910-11, p. 33.
59 Julius Herschfeld, (1912), 13 J. of the Soc. of Comp. Legis. 119.
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dorsed by both bodies. It has been reinforced by the recommendations
of two subsequent Royal Commissions. 60
The Act is divided into two parts. Most employers and workmen
come under Part I. Where a workman is injured in the course of
employment to which Part I applies, the employer is liable to pro-
vide or pay compensation in the manner or to the extent provided
in the Act. These payments are made from a fund provided by assess-
ments made on employers. All right of action against the employer
is taken away.
61
The Act does not apply where the injury does not disable the
workman from earning full wages at the work at which he is em-
ployed for three calendar days or where the injury is attributable
solely to "serious and wilful misconduct of the workman unless the
injury results in death or serious disablement."
Where the workman is not employed in an industry coming
under Part I of the Act, liability without fault is imposed on the
employer for defect in the condition or arrangement of the ways,
works, machinery, plant, buildings or premises connected with, in-
tended for or used in the business of the employer. The defences of
common employment, volenti non fit injuria and contributory negli-
gence are not available to employers coming under Part I of the
Act but contributory negligence of the workman may be taken into
account in assessing damages. The Act does not apply to farming
operations nor to domestic or menial services. These employees are
left to their common law rights.
Notwithstanding the legalistic attacks on the principle of liability
without fault introduced by the Workmen's Compensation Acts of
50 years ago, every province in Canada has adopted legislation of
this character. Likewise, every State in the United States of America
and every industrial country in the Western world has workmen's
compensation legislation of some sort. In many countries Workmen's
Compensation has become part of a comprehensive social security
scheme.
The inescapable fact is that with the Industrial Revolution and
the mechanization of industry new conditions evolved at the begin-
ning of the 20th century that made it imperative that other means
be devised for determining compensation for injured workmen than
through the prevailing doctrines of the common law and the prevail-
ing judicial procedures. Experience made it clear that the law of
torts as administered in the courts was inadequate to serve the pur-
poses of the prevailing "necessities of the time". The means that have
been devised may not be entirely satisfactory but after 50 years'
experience little support could be gained today for any move to return
60 Mr. Justice Middleton, 11th February 1932, reported in Ontario
SessionaZ Papers, 1932, Vol. LXIV, Part VI; Report of Mr. Justice Roach, re-
leased May 31, 1950.
61 R.S.0. 1960, c. 437, s. 13.
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to the principle of liability of employers dependent on proof of fault
determined in the ordinary courts. The invention of the steam engine
and the resultant mechanization of industry which had accelerated
the expansion of the doctrine of no liability except on proof of fault
by the mid-19th century were the very forces that, because of their
rapid development, made it necessary to return to the doctrine of
strict liability for industrial accidents by the end of that century.
Just as mechanization brought about a revolution in industry
during the 19th century, the combustion engine and the mechaniza-
tion of the means of transportation on the highways have brought
about a revolution in the use of the highways during the first half of
the 20th century. This revolution raises the same questions with
respect to accidents caused in the operation of motor vehicles as
were raised throughout the western world 60 years ago with respect
to industrial injuries caused to workmen. Today we ask ourselves
the same question as was asked then: Is the law of torts as it is
administered in the courts adequate to do justice to those who suffer
injuries by reason of motor vehicles on the highways? To this I
would add another question and probably a more important one: Are
we in fact really administering the law of torts at all in this field
of accident liability?
The use of the motor vehicle as a popular means of transporta-
tion of goods and persons was quite unknown when the principles of
the law of negligence were being developed. The high speed motor
vehicle in general use, operating on hard surfaced highways as
developed during the last 50 years, has introduced factors making
former procedures and former principles extraordinarily difficult to
apply. The common law doctrines as applied to horse-drawn vehicles
or even to ox carts in use 100 years ago may have theoretical applica-
tion to the operation of fast moving motor vehicles some of which
in fact move at the legal rate of 60 miles per hour and in some places
at an annual hourly average of 2,830 past a given point for every hour
in the year,62 but actual precise application is not possible.
Recognizing the inadequacy of the common law, the legislature
has made many changes in the law and it has defined many duties.
Some of the changes have simplified the task of administering justice
between man and man, some have made it more difficult, while others
have denied justice to injured victims of motor vehicle accidents
altogether. The legislators have gone to extremes by, in effect,
acknowledging the principle of liability without proof of fault to be
applicable to certain cases while in others all right to recover even
where fault is either proved or admitted has been taken away.
The first legislation regulating motor vehicles in Ontario63 recog-
nized the operation of a motor vehicle as something attended by
extraordinary danger. It provided:
62 Annual Average Daily Traffic Volume, Ontario Department of High.
ways.
6 Statutes of Ontario, 6 Edw. VII, c. 46, passed in 1906.
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When any loss or damage is incurred or sustained by any person by a
motor vehicle, the onus of proof that such loss or damage did not arise
through the negligence or improper conduct of the owner or driver of
the motor vehicle shall be upon the owner or driver of such vehicle.
This shift of the onus of proof was for all practical purposes a rever-
sion to the law of Weaver v. Ward. It was more than a halfway move
toward liability without fault. The difficulties of applying such a
statutory onus to cases where there were collisions between motor
vehicles are quite apparent. By an amendment in 1923, collisions
between motor vehicles were excluded from its application,64 and in
192665 actions brought by passengers in motor vehicles in respect of
injuries sustained while a passenger were likewise excluded.
The standard of proof required to disprove negligence where the
Act now applies, virtually amounts to a standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The onus is not a shifting onus. It remains on the
defendant to the end of the case. If at the end of the case the mind
of the tribunal of fact is in a condition of doubt as to whether the
defendant has proved that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff did
not arise through negligence or improper conduct on the part of the
defendant, the doubt must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff.66
The jury is not required to find any particular negligence on the part
of the defendant but it is only required to direct its mind to whether
negligence or improper conduct has been disproved; each juryman
may have a different reason for coming to a conclusion that negli-
gence has not been disproved and each may base his verdict on any
arbitrary ground he wishes as long as there is any evidence to sup-
port the verdict of the jury. In effect, this section gives the jury a
power to act arbitrarily and to virtually impose strict liability, al-
though it is not so declared by statute.
With respect to owners of motor vehicles, liability is imposed
without proof of either fault or the common law relationship of
master and servant. The driver's negligence is imposed on the owner
upon mere proof of possession unless the owner proves that possession
is without his consent.67 Such legislation would have caused great
distress to Dr. Baty who fifty years ago believed that the common
law doctrine of the vicarious liability of the employer for the acts of
his servant done in the course of his employment was all quite wrong.68
On the other hand, all right of action based on negligence against
the driver of a motor vehicle is taken away where the injured party
is "being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alight-
ing from the motor vehicle," except where the vehicle is operated in
the business of carrying passengers for compensation. 69 It is difficult
to justify this legislation on any principle of law or justice. If my
64 Statutes of Ontario, 1923, c. 48, s. 43(2).
65 Now R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 105(2).
66 Winnipeg Electric Company v. Jacob GeeZ, [1932] A.C. 690.
67 The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 105(1).
68 T. Baty, Vicarious Liability, A Short History of the Law of Employers,
Etc. See comments by Sir Frederick Pollock in Holmes-Pollock Letters, Vol.
1, p. 233, reviewed in (1916), 32 L.Q.R. 226.
69 The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 105(2).
1966]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
neighbour asks me to ride downtown with him in his motor car the
common law imposes on him a duty to drive carefully but the law of
Ontario says that I take the risk of his negligent driving. If I find
that he is intoxicated and I attempt to leave his motor car while
he is st6pped at a traffic light and even if he recklessly moves the
motor car while I am alighting and I am injured, I cannot recover,
but if I succeed in alighting safely and he runs over me after I have
alighted I can recover upon mere proof that the accident happened,
unless he disproves his negligence.
This legislation cannot be supported on any theory of assumption
of the risk. It applies equally to an adult, a child of tender years and
an infant in arms. The legislation was a mere concession to expe-
diency. History shows that when motor vehicle accident insurance
became general, owners and drivers did not have the same urge to
vigorously defend passenger accident cases as the loss was falling on
the insurer. The ordinary law of torts was so difficult to apply and
administer that it was felt necessary for the Legislature to intervene.
It intervened in the simplest way and in a partisan way by destroying
all right of action by the injured party. It is true that there may
have been dishonest claims but the innocent were made to suffer
with the guilty. The principle of absolute liability is applied in the
reverse-there is absolutely no liability.
In 192470 the law of the Admiralty Courts, which has its origin
in the civil law, was adopted in Ontario by providing for the appor-
tionment of negligence where the court finds that both the plaintiff
and the defendant are at fault. This relieved hardship on plaintiffs
who would otherwise be deprived of all right to recover merely on
the proof of some contributory negligence on their part, but as
applied to motor vehicle cases it introduced a wide area for specu-
lative guesswork on the part of judges and juries. For example, let
us examine the standard questions submitted to a jury where there
is trial by jury and by a judge to himself where the case is tried
without a jury. In a simple case where an action is brought by a
pedestrian for injuries sustained by reason of the operation of a
motor vehicle on a highway, questions of the following type are
submitted:
(1) Has the defendant satisfied you that there was no negligence or
improper conduct on his part which caused or contributed to the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff?
Answer yes or no.
(2) Do you find any negligence on the part of the plaintiff which caused
or contributed to the injuries sustained by him?
Answer yes or no.
(3) If your answer to question 2 is 'yes' in what did such negligence
consist? State fully.
(4) If your answer to question 1 is 'no' and question 2 is 'yes' how




70 14 Geo. V, c. 32, now as amended, R.S.O. 1960, c. 261.
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(5) Irrespective of the answers to the foregoing questions, at what
amount do you assess the total damages sustained by the plaintiff?
In putting the onus on the owner or driver of the motor vehicle
the words in The Highway Traffic Act require the defendant to dis-
prove "negligence or improper conduct", 71 while the words used in
The Negligence Act requiring apportionment of fault are "fault or
negligence". I have never been quite able to understand what these
alternatives mean. The words "improper conduct" are used in the
one statute as an alternative to "negligence" and in the other the
word "fault" is an alternative to "negligence". Nevertheless, the court
or the jury, as the case may be, is asked to apportion the degrees of
fault as if the words all mean the same thing. But even if we assume
that they do mean the same thing in the law of torts, the judge or
the jury is asked to fix percentages with respect to two things that
are quite different as if they were the same thing. As far as the
defendant is concerned, no finding of fault or negligence is necessary.
All that is required is a negative finding, that is a finding that the
defendant has not proved that there was no "negligence or improper
conduct" on his part. On the other hand, if negligence is found on
the part of the plaintiff, that negligence must be specified. The prob-
lem is, how does one apportion the degrees of fault when one is
merely required a make a negative finding with respect to the defend-
ant's "fault" but a positive finding with respect to the plaintiff's
"fault"? What the judge or jury must do is add a negative finding
to a positive finding and divide the total into percentages as if both
factors were positive. I am sure that is something that would con-
found the best efforts of the most skilled mathematicians.
When The Negligence Act is applied to the case where a gra-
tuitous passenger has been injured in a collision between two motor
vehicles, not only is the unfortunate passenger deprived of any cause
of action against his driver, but in an action against the driver-owner
of the vehicle in which he was not a passenger he must suffer an
apportionment of the damages based on the fault of his driver. In
these cases the common law liability of joint tort feasors has been
quite destroyed and in no case can the gratuitous passenger recover
his full loss if it has been shown that his own driver has been negli-
gent. It is hard to disagree with Dean Wright when he says: "To me
this is not merely nonsense but unnecessary and vicious nonsense."72
This provision in The Negligence Act is due to another provision
providing for contribution between joint tort feasors which would
leave a way open for the passenger to reach his negligent driver
indirectly as a joint tort feasor. The end does not justify the means
used. It is a case of one piece of bad legislation begetting another.
71 R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 106.
72 6 J. Soc. Pub. T.L. 23.
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The fact that all owners of motor vehicles either carry casualty
insurance73 or come under the limited plan of state insurance74 has
brought about great procedural changes in the application of the law
of torts. In the first place, the contest in court is seldom between the
injured party and the wrongdoer. It is either between the injured
party and the wrongdoer's insurance company or the Government
of Ontario, as represented by the Department of Transport. The
conduct of the defence is taken out of the hands of the defendant.
The concept of deterrence has almost entirely disappeared. The insur-
ance company, if not defending in the name of the defendant, may
be suing in the name of the insured under subrogation, or, it may
be, defending in the name of the defendant and be plaintiff by coun-
terclaim, or it may be only partly interested if the insurance is
insufficient to cover the loss.
What concerns those engaged in the administration of justice
most is whether the courts of justice are really exercising their true
functions with respect to injuries arising out of motor vehicle acci-
dents under the conditions that in fact exist. We ask ourselves three
questions:
(1) Is the law of torts as we conceive it to be appropriate to meet the
changed conditions of 1965?
(2) What is the real function that the courts are in fact performing in
this field of tort law?
(3) Are the present processes of the courts the best method that can be
devised to provide just compensation for injuries sustained through
the operation of motor vehicles on the highways?
To answer the first question one must examine the process by which
liability and compensation are determined in the motor vehicle cases
that now come before the courts. In Ontario either party has a right
to trial by jury in a motor vehicle accident case. This right is not
always exercised but whether the case is tried by a judge sitting
alone or by a judge and jury, the tribunal of fact has to determine
liability arising out of conditions that were never dreamed of when
the concepts of negligence were forged in the common law courts.
The court is asked to come to a conclusion on what the fictional
reasonable and prudent man would have done in circumstances which
more often than not required split second decisions. Witnesses are
asked to tell, months or years after the event, with great accuracy,
their observation of events prior to and leading up to an accident
73 Motor vehicle insurance, although not explicitly required by the law
of Ontario, is definitely recognized in meeting the proof of financial responsi.
bility required upon the issue of a motor vehicle permit. The Highway Traffic
Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 117.
74 If financial responsibility is not established the applicant for a motor
vehicle permit must pay a premium of $20 per annum for the limited protec-
tion given to persons who may be injured through the negligence of the driver
of the motor vehicle. See The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, 1962, 10-11
Eliz. II, c. 84. This is a state insurance scheme for the protection of injured
persons and it is not for the protection of owners or operators of motor
vehicles. The injured persons may elect to claim either against the owner or
driver or against the state fund, but not both.
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when they had no occasion whatever to make any observations
because no accident was anticipated. The evidence in the ordinary
intersection case affords the best example of the unreality of evi-
dence of this character. It would require several witnesses observing
the accident armed with directors and stop watches to give the sort
of evidence witnesses are continually asked to give in these cases.
The witness is asked how far he was from the intersection when he
looked to the right and where he was when he looked to the left,
where he was when he sounded his horn and where he was when
he applied the brakes. A great part of the evidence in actions arising
out of motor vehicle accidents is in fact reconstruction and too often
reconstruction with an eye on the result. Dean Wright has said:
Lawyers supporting the trial jury are willing to admit that in the
ordinary automobile accident the case that is actually tried by a jury is
a case that never in fact took place, and is the result of conjectural recall,
imagination, colourful dramatization, and pure inventiveness.75
I do not think Dean Wright has over-stated the case, but I would
apply his comments with equal force to those cases tried by a judge
without a jury.
The violence of motor vehicle accidents is such that in many
cases the witnesses who might have some knowledge of how the
accident happened are either killed or suffer from traumatic amnesia
to such an extent that they are unable to relate any of the events
leading up to or following the accident. In such cases the parties who
are justly entitled to compensation may be entirely deprived of any
relief because the evidence on their behalf has been extinguished by
the force of the accident, or, on the other hand, liability may be
imposed for the same reason where there is no fault.
The difficulties of the courts do not end with the uncertainties
and imponderables in determining liability. A just and fair assess-
ment of damages presents equal, if not greater, difficulties and equal
speculation.
Many cases are comparatively simple but where there has been
a serious injury or a fatal injury the judgment of the court, final
as it is, must in respect of general damages be based largely on
conjecture.
What is just compensation for a child that has lost an eye, or
a young wife and family that have lost the breadwinner, or a farmer
that has lost an arm, or a young mother that is paralyzed for life?
Often the compensation is determined by the limitation of the de-
fendant's insurance policy. In the case of the child who has lost an
eye it may, through accident or disease, lose the other eye. The court
is asked to take this into consideration. What does that mean in
dollars and cents? The young wife may marry again or she may not.
The court is asked to take that into consideration. What does that
mean in dollars and cents? Likewise, the young farmer who has
75 6 J. Soc. Pub. T.L. 19.
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lost his arm may be so handicapped that he has to give up his farm
but he may become a drover and he may be much better off finan-
cially. How can a just result be arrived at by considering unknown
and speculative factors? Although these difficulties arise in assessing
damages in all personal injury cases, they are particularly emphasized
in motor vehicle cases as they were emphasized in the common law
employers' liability cases. In those cases the difficulties were resolved
in Ontario by providing for disability allowances payable out of the
compensation fund according to the continuance of the disability.
IV
All the hazards of proof of liability in motor vehicle accident
cases and the difficulties in assessing damages have united with the
growth of casualty insurance during the last fifty years to reduce
the use of the processes of administering justice to little more than
an instrument in the adjustment of claims, be the adjustment between
individuals or between individuals and insurance companies or be-
tween individuals and the Department of Transport.
This is amply demonstrated by the experience in the County of
York in the Province of Ontario, which is quite typical of that
throughout the Province. In the year 1964, which was not an un-
usual year,
-458 actions arising out of motor vehicle accidents were entered for trial
for the Winter Assizes-of these 19 were tried and 128 were settled;
-438 were entered for the Spring Assizes-of these 25 were tried and
116 were settled;
-548 were entered for the Autumn Assizes-of these 26 were tried and
103 were settled.
Actions not disposed of at a particular Assize were either among
those that were re-set down for trial at the next Assize or were dis-
posed of without further reference to the court. The proportion re-set
down cannot be readily ascertained. The experience of the year 1964
was quite similar to previous years. It is a fair estimate that less
than 15% of actions commenced that arise out of motor vehicle
accidents are ever tried.
These facts show that the normal processes of the courts really
do not function in this field of law to serve the public according to
their intended purposes.
In many jurisdictions in the United States of America pro-
cedures have been adopted whereby the judges preside over settle-
ment conferences and hold pre-trial hearings which are intended
to promote settlements. This is a procedure that is alien to a true
process of administering justice according to law. The proper and
primary function of a court of justice is not to provide a judicial
conciliation but to try cases. It is normal and it is desirable that many
cases be settled, even after an action has been commenced. But when
only a small fraction of the cases that have gone the whole process
of being prepared and set down for trial and are on the list for trial
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with the attendant cost to the litigants, actually go on for trial, the
judicial process is being used for other than judicial purposes. It is
not too strong to say that it is being used as a threat to bring about
an adjustment rather than a means of adjudication.
The language Mr. Young B. Smith used in commenting on the
Report made to the Columbia University Council for research in the
Social Sciences by the Committee to Study Compensation for Auto-
mobile Accidents, which studied and reported on the administration
of justice in relation to compensation for injuries sustained in motor
vehicle accidents is quite applicable to conditions in Ontario today.
He said:
To borrow the language of Dean Pound, the report may be aptly
described as a study of the law in action as distinguished from the law
in books. As such, it demonstrates convincingly that whatever may be
said in favour of a social policy which predicates liability upon fault
and contemplates adequate compensation for injuries thus caused, that
policy is not carried out under existing law.76
Suggestions have been made from time to time that there should
be some form of pre-trial after actions have been entered for trial
to make sure that the action is ready for trial and to bring plaintiffs
and defendants together with a view to promoting a settlement.
The adoption of such a proposal, instead of expediting trials would
provide a means of delay, increase costs and give greater opportunity
to put pressure on one side or the other to bring about a settlement.
Such pre-trial procedure is just a further prostitution of the judicial
process. The judicial function is not to intimidate litigants into settle-
ment but to preside over trials and decide cases. It is quite true that
when the presiding judge has heard sufficient of the facts at the trial
he may sometimes by wise suggestion enable parties to adjust their
difficulties, but that is a usefulness that a judge should reserve for
exceptional cases. The problems arising out of motor vehicle accidents
cannot be solved by merely aggravating the misuse of the courts.
Motor vehicle accident facts demonstrate quite clearly the
pressure of the "felt necessities of the time" in this realm of tort
law. In Ontario, with a population of about 8,000,000, there is one
registered motor vehicle for every four of the population. In the
year 1964 there were 54,560 persons injured in motor vehicle accidents
and 1,424 persons were killed.77 The increase during the last ten
years in persons killed and injured has been over 100%, and during
the last two years it has been 14% annually.
In these circumstances the orderly judicial process of applying
the law of torts and the laws of evidence has proved quite inadequate
to provide prompt and just service to the public in determining
liability and just compensation. Since the processes of law have
not afforded injured persons effective means of relief they have been
76 Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium (1932), 32
Col. Law Rev. 785, at p. 786.
77 Accident Facts, published by the Ontario Department of Transport.
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forced to resort to the well-known methods used in the Middle East
in the retail trade-bargaining. The ordinary judicial procedure has
become only a tool used in the bargaining procedure. One of the
unfortunate things in this procedure is that the injured person arrives
late and is seldom in an equal bargaining position. He has been re-
covering from his injuries and he has already been weighed down with
anxiety through financial loss due to the accident. In addition, the
facts as related may or may not be true. He is faced with all the
uncertainties of a lawsuit, a split verdict and a very considerable
risk as to costs-a risk that can be greatly increased by the defendant
paying money into court. In addition, the accident may have
destroyed his best evidence. In the result, in considerably over 90%
of the cases liability is not determined and compensation is not fixed
by any legal procedure but by a mere process of negotiation.
These facts demonstrate that in the field of personal injuries
through the operation of motor vehicles on the highways the ordinary
courts have been proved to be incapable of administering justice
in its traditional and accepted sense. That being true, the question
is, what is the alternative? Canadian experience supports three
alternatives:
1. The scheme that has been in effect in the Province of Sas-
katchewan since 1946.78
2. The recommendation of the Joint Committee of the Ontario
Legislature made in 1963.
3. A plan based on The Workmen's Compensation Act of On-
tario and similar acts in force in all the Provinces of Canada.
The Saskatchewan plan provides for a state-operated insurance
scheme providing limited compensation based on liability without
fault with the right to sue in the courts in an action based on fault
where the state compensation is deemed insufficient. In such cases
the amount paid by the state is credited on any judgment obtained.
This in effect is a state group accident insurance policy with benefits
within certain prescribed limits. All persons are insured to the extent
of the policy against injury arising out of an accident within the
Province caused by reason of the operation of a motor vehicle on
the highway. For the insurance, operators of motor vehicles pay a
very reasonable premium. The fact that the scheme has been in effect
in Saskatchewan for almost 19 years is some proof that the people of
that Province are satisfied with its operation. It is quite safe to say
that there has been no responsible suggestion in the Province to
return to the common law procedure in effect in other Provinces in
Canada.
79 The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1946, R.S.S. 1953, c. 371, and
amendments thereto, based on the recommendations of the Columbia Uni-
versity Report with many of the objectionable recommendations eliminated.
See also, Austin J. Lilly, Compensatioin for Automobile Accidents: A Sym-
posium (1932), 32 Col. Law Rev. 803, and a review of the Saskatchewan
legislation in 31 J. of the Soc. of Comp. Legis. 39.
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In 1963 an all-party Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature
recommended the adoption of a plan involving limited liability without
fault based on the Saskatchewan plan through insurance carried in
private insurance companies. Under the plan the owners of motor
vehicles would pay an increased premium to give an all-inclusive







18 years to 59 years .................................................................. $5,000 $1,000
60 years to 70 ................................................................................... 3,000 1,000
70 years and over ....................................................................... 2,000 1,000
Married Female
18 years to 59 years .................................................................. 2,500 1,000
60 years to 69 years .................................................................. 1,500 1,000
70 years and over ....................................................................... 1,000 1,000
(if deceased is a widower or widow, the appropriate principal sum
for first dependent plus $1,000 for each additional dependent. If
deceased is an unmarried person 18 years or over with dependent(s)
the appropriate principal sum with $1,000 for each additional de-
pendent.)
Child With Parent Living
4 years an d un der ........................................................................................................ $ 250
5 to 17 years inclusive ................................................. 500
Subsection 2-Dismemberment and loss of sight
Loss of tw o hands or feet ............................................................................................... $5 ,000
Loss of entire sight of both eyes .................................................................. 5,000
Loss of one hand and one foot ................................................................................... 5,000
Loss of one arm above elbow .................................................................................... 3,750
Loss of one leg above knee ...................... 3,750
L oss of one han d or foot .................................................................................................. 2,500
L oss of entire sight of one eye ................................................................................. 2,500
Subsection 3-Medical payments
Indemnity to the extent of $2,000 for reasonable expenses incurred
for necessary medical, surgical, dental, ambulance, hospital (excess
of payments under Ontario Hospital Service Commission payments)
and professional nursing.
Subsection 4-Funeral Expenses
$350 for each person.
Subsection 5--Weekly Benefits
$35 per week payable to an employed person when totally disabled
from work subject to a limit of 104 weeks.
(If at the expiry of the said 104 weeks such person establishes a
total and permanent disability, $35 per week will be paid for an
additional 104 weeks).
$25 per week payable to a housewife when totally disabled from
work subject to a limit of 12 weeks.
In both cases there would be no payment for the first seven days'
disability.
The Committee recommended:
(1) That coverages along the foregoing lines be made an integral
and mandatory part of the standard automobile policy sold
in the Province of Ontario.
(2) That any payment of a benefit under the foregoing cover-
ages be offset against damages recoverable under any third
party liability coverage.
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This plan has not yet been adopted by the Legislature.
The third suggestion, based on the experience in Ontario for 50
years in the operation of The Workmen's Compensation Act, is the
most comprehensive alternative to the common law procedure.
The philosophy adopted by the Board operating under the Act
is that the injured workman ceases to be a social asset and becomes
a social liability. To that end the Act and its administration are
designed to accomplish two purposes:
(1) To restore the workman to society as a social asset.
(2) To provide means to assist him and his dependents during his
disability.
To accomplish these purposes workmen's compensation is removed
from the private insurance field, through the employers' paying
an annual assessment into an exclusive non-profit fund provided
through compulsory collective liability. This is not the place to enter
on a discussion of the details of the Act or its administration. It is
sufficient to say that after 50 years' experience there is no body of
public opinion that would support any other system for providing
compensation for injured workmen. With the emphasis on rehabilita-
tion the Board operates its own hospital and its own rehabilitation
centre. The best medical service is freely provided and paid for. The
workman may select his own doctor and in addition the Board will
provide the services of specialists wherever required. Patients are
sent for hundreds of miles to receive special treatment that would
never be available to them under any system of pecuniary compensa-
tion based on fault. The rehabilitation ratio has been most satis-
factory. Ontario has the lowest percentage of permanent disability
of any workmen's compensation authority on the American continent
reporting to the United States Bureau of Standards. The following
is a comparative table of permanent disability cases:
The ratio of permanent disability cases of all compensation cases re-
ported was in
Illin ois ............................................................... 30.59
O klahom a ...................................................... 29.62
T exas .................................................................. 24.02
M issouri ........................................................ 19 02
Connecticut ............................................... 17.89
In dian a ............................................................ 17.80
K ansas ............................................................ 17.59
Minnesota ................ 16.63
British Columbia ........... 5.12
Alberta .......... ..... 4.67
Ontario ................. 3.77
This table emphasizes the economical importance of well super-
vised medical treatment and rehabilitation.
During the period of rehabilitation the workman is paid com-
pensation for loss of wages at the rate of 75% of his average
earnings, limited to $6,000 per year. In the case of permanent dis-
ability, pensions are fixed according to the degree of this disability.
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Pensions are also provided for dependents of workmen who die from
industrial injuries or certain industrial diseases.
Approximately 65,000 compensatable claims are disposed of
annually. In the year 1963, the total benefits paid amounted to
$60,260,000.
79
Of the total assessments 89.5% is paid out to injured workmen
or their dependents, 3.5% is paid for accident prevention and 7.2%
for the costs of administration.
A fair estimate, derived from reliable sources, of the amount
paid annually for compensation for personal injuries sustained arising
out of the operation of motor vehicles in Ontario is now approxi-
mately $35,000,000.
No rash conclusions should be drawn from a comparison of the
amount paid for compensation for workmen's injuries and the amount
paid out to compensate those who have sustained injury in motor
vehicle accidents as other factors must be taken into consideration,
for example: the costs of litigation and the portion of the insurance
premium that is allotted to administration and the number of injured
who receive no compensation. Nevertheless, the comparison does
demonstrate that the experience of the Workmen's Compensation
Board proves that the problem of compensating for injuries sustained
through the operation of motor vehicles is capable of being solved
on the same principles as the problem of compensating for injuries
sustained in industrial accidents has been solved. This is particularly
true in the Province of Ontario which now provides province-wide
hospitalization and is moving toward a complete medical care plan.
In an impressive address delivered before the Southern Tas-
manian Bar Association in October 1963, Sir John Barry discussed
many aspects of the problem of compensation without liability. In
that address he referred to the Saskatchewan Act as embodying the
scheme most valuable for consideration. Of all schemes in effect I
think this is true but in the words of Sir William Meredith, the
father of all Workmen's Compensation law in Canada, I would say,
Half measures which mitigate but do not remove injustice are, in my
judgment, to be avoided.8 0
I think the Saskatchewan scheme and the scheme proposed by
the Ontario Select Committee may rightfully be termed "half
measures" that do not remove injustice and they fail to apply the most
efficient means of restoring injured persons as social assets.
Modern social and industrial conditions have imposed on every
member of society the risk of using the highways as they are today.
Compensation for injuries sustained by reason of motor vehicles
irrespective of fault is a burden that can well be distributed among
79 Annual Report of Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board, 1963.
80 Ontario SessionaZ Papers, 1914, Vol. XLVI, p. 17.
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all those for whose benefit the highways have been developed.
Momentary inattention or error in judgment are faults common to
everyone, but under the law as it is these may mean the difference
between compensation or no compensation. On the other hand, any
solution of this problem should not provide compensation for anyone
who has been injured through a reckless disregard for his own safety.
Since the theory of deterrence in this branch of tort law has
become archaic a different approach to the problem may be taken.
The solution need not and in my view should not deprive injured
persons of all access to the courts nor should it deprive the courts
of their supervisory powers.
The difficulties that arise in administering the law of torts as
it relates to personal injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents
can neither be resolved by disregarding them nor by building bigger
court houses and appointing more judges. They are far too funda-
mental for that. These difficulties involve the basic question of ad-
ministering justice according to law.
Lawyers and those who will be lawyers must realize that when
the public is confronted with problems of this character solutions are
found and it is much better that the solutions be arrived at with the
co-operation of the legal profession than without it. The sole objective
should be to find by what means the public can best be served, always
remembering the words of Sir James Stephen, one of the great
lawyers and judges of all time, quoted by Sir Frederick Pollock, an-
other of the greatest English lawyers, in writing to an equally great
American lawyer and judge, Mr. Justice Holmes:
* laws exist not for the scientific satisfaction of the legal mind, but
for the convenience of the lay people.. 81
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